so.
As Linnekin and Poyer argue, this idea and the ethnic theory of identity that derives from it, should not be assumed to inform all theories of identity; thus, the analytical challenge raised by the volume on Cultural identity and ethnicity in the Pacific is to recognize the existence of other, alternative constructs of identity and difference; in other words, the goal is to investigate other people's ethnotheories, rather than to assume that these must be ethnic theories (Linnekin and Poyer 1990:5) .
2 This paper aims to contribute to this project; it investigates the Vezo's ethnotheory, and shows that it is not an ethnic theory: the Vezo maintain that they are not what they are because they were born to be so. Their alternative model of identity and difference stresses instead that Vezo become what they are through what they do; both identity and difference result from activities that people perform in the present, rather than from a common or distinct origin they acquired at some point in the past.
Because of the nature of their identity, the Vezo have often been considered by various scholars something of an anomaly --a group of people who did not fit into the `ethnic map' of Madagascar. 3 As I read the relevant literature in preparation for fieldwork, I became increasingly attracted to the Vezo, who seemed to defy any attempt to impose `ethnicity' to them. As a background to my own findings, let me briefly explain the `problem' constituted by the Vezo population.
`Ethnicity' on the West coast On reading the accounts by early travellers or missionaries, or more recent reports by geographers, anthropologists or historians, one is struck by the insistence with which these authors argue that the Vezo should be regarded as a fishing and coastal people. 4 After spending a few days among the Vezo, I realized that this emphasis reflected a local preoccupation. Any attempt on my part to learn new words related to fishing or sailing, for example, prompted my Vezo instructors to explain that the people who fish and sail are Vezo; similarly, when I showed a group of young men a map of the coastal region, they told me that all the people who live along the coast, near the sea, are Vezo. When I eventually learnt the words to ask who the Vezo are, what type of people they consider themselves to be, I was told that the Vezo are `people who struggle with the sea and live on the coast' (olo mitolo rano, olo mipetsaky andriaky). Indeed any statement about a custom, an activity or an inclination reputed to be Vezo, would be prefaced by `we people who live on the coast, do this and that...', or `we people who struggle with the sea are used to this or that...', and so on.
Similarly, I was repeatedly told that the Vezo's neighbours, the Masikoro, are people who live in the interior (antety), who cultivate rice, maize and manioc (mamboly vary, tsako, balahazo) and raise cattle (mihary aomby). And in this case, any statement about a custom, an activity or an inclination reputed to be Masikoro would be prefaced by `those people who live in the interior, do this and that...', or `those people who cultivate and raise cattle are used to this and that...', and so on.
Given the emphatic way with which the Vezo define themselves and their neighbours in terms of their occupation and their place of residence, the literature's preoccupation with these features is hardly surprising. Rather more unusual, however, is the attitude towards the Vezo's self-definition: for having recognized that the Vezo are people devoted to fishing and inhabitants of the coast, it is then usual to add that the Vezo are just a fishing and coastal people. Why just, the naive reader asks? what else could the Vezo be? The answer seems to be that the self-defining label `Vezo' refers just to a mode of livelihood --fishing --which is in fact regarded as the only distinguishing feature of the Vezo; this is confirmed by the oftmentioned fact that if a person leaves the coast to move to the interior, she ceases to be Vezo and becomes Masikoro, a point to which I shall return further on. It has thus been concluded that the term `Vezo' does not indicate a trait of identity that is fixed and immutable, for people can move and thereby change their livelihood. For this reason, scholars have agreed that the Vezo fail to be a `genuine ethnic group' (une ethnie veritable), a `special race' (une race spéciale), or a `distinct people' (une peuplade distincte).
Curiously, having come this close to describing an `ethnotheory' of identity that is alternative to ethnicity --namely, that Vezo people are what they do for their livelihood --, these ethnographers failed to recognize their own finding. In one case, the curator of the official ethnographic Atlas of Madagascar comes close to suggesting, like the judges in the famous Mashpee case (Clifford 1988) , that since the Vezo are not an ethnic group, they do not in fact exist (Association 1969-70, fig.21 ). 5 Most ethnographers, however, have been rather less drastic. Assuming that the Vezo, like everyone else, must have an ethnic affiliation, they argue that if the Vezo as such are not an ethnic group, they must belong to another, broader ethnic grouping.
On these grounds, the Vezo have been assigned to the `large Sakalava ethnic family' (Koechlin 1975:26) , within which they represent a technologically-defined sub-group among others. Having thus attributed an ethnic affiliation to the Vezo, the fact that the label `Vezo' seems to describe only what the Vezo do and where they live while it fails to reveal who the Vezo `genuinely' are, ceases to be problematic.
Yet this solution in turn raises new problems. Firstly, the notion that the Sakalava are a `genuine ethnic group' can be disputed. 6 The term Sakalava refers to the kingdoms in western Madagascar established through conquest by a foreign dynasty; to be Sakalava means, to this day, to be a subject of the Sakalava rulers. As recent work by Feeley-Harnik (1991) clearly shows, the Sakalava `ethnotheory' cannot be assumed to be an ethnic theory, since it is not based on a `born to be so' condition, but is predicated on people's active and willing subjection to the monarchy, on their ritual work and on their political allegiance. Secondly, it is highly problematic to impute to the Vezo an identity, ethnic or otherwise, which they do not recognize as their own, and which, somewhat paradoxically, they have been systematically denied by the historians of the region. Thus, while my informants never defined themselves as Sakalava, and proudly recounted how the Vezo had never subjected themselves to the Sakalava kings and had taken to their canoes to flee all kinds of authority (see below), historians have argued that the Vezo were peripheral to the Sakalava kingdom because they failed to participate in the economic order dominated by animal husbandry imposed by the new rulers (Lombard 1988; Schlemmer 1980 Schlemmer , 1983 . In other words, it is argued that the Vezo, as fishing people, possessed a specialized system of production that situated them outside the Sakalava economic and political entity.
The Vezo therefore pose a seemingly insoluble conundrum for the literature: on the one hand, the ethnographers argue that they must be Sakalava because being `people who struggle with the sea and live on the coast' is not enough to provide them with an ethnic affiliation; on the other hand, the historians have told us that they cannot be Sakalava for the same reason, namely that they are fishing people. Poyer (1990) , with special reference to the relationship between land and people. The third part considers how difference is construed analogically: people who differ from the Vezo do so through the same process of `identification' that makes the Vezo what they are. In other words, people differ because of the different things they do. Finally, the fourth section discusses how the Vezo portray their place in the history of the Sakalava kingdoms --one example of the Vezo denial of the determining power of the past over the present.
Let me clarify at the outset that I do not wish to imply that the Vezo are unique in the way they construe identity. I am certainly not the first to suggest or imply that the concept of `ethnicity' is problematic in the Malagasy context. 7 This is hardly surprising if we consider how different the construct of the ethnic person is from the construct of the Malagasy person.
While the ethnic theory of identity draws on the notion that a person is what it was born to be, and that birth into a group fixes its identity in time and space, Malagasy people share a concept of the person which, to borrow from Southall's definition of Malagasy kinship as `cumulative kinship', can be glossed as `cumulative personhood': `something achieved gradually and progressively throughout life, and even after death, rather than ascribed and fixed definitively at birth' (Southall 1986:417). 8 The `cumulative' process of becoming that I describe for the Vezo is thus an example --possibly an extreme example --of a feature shared by all Malagasy people and indeed, as Fox suggests (1987) , by all Austronesian people.
Identity as doing
In the early stages of my fieldwork, I asked questions and made remarks that often implied a theory of identity based on the idea that people are what they were born to be. For example, I
asked why villagers who had migrated from the south and were of Antandroy origin were considered Vezo; or I expressed surprise that people with a broad range of ancestral customs could all nonetheless be Vezo. Faced with these questions, my friends would answer: `the Vezo are not a kind of people' (Vezo tsy karazan'olo).
The word karaza means `kind', type, and indicates groups of objects, animals or people that share some essential characteristics (see also Bloch 1971:42-3). For example, fish is a `kind' of living thing, and Spanish mackerel is a `kind' of fish. The word raza, from which karaza derives, refers in turn to the ancestors, and in particular to the ancestors of a certain `kind', those who are buried in the same tomb and are referred to as `one raza' (raza raiky). This is how things go. We learnt about the canoe and we know about the canoe; our grandchildren learn about it also. This is how things go.
Here Rolpha was addressing what seem at surface to be two distinct issues, how non-Vezo become Vezo and how the children of Vezo parents become Vezo themselves.
Let us take the second point first. Children and grandchildren follow their parents' steps and become, rather than being already, what their parents and grandparents were before them.
Vezo-ness, in other words, is not inherited; it has to be learnt in order to be transmitted over the generations. Turning now to the first issue, we find that Rolpha's description of his ancestors' transformation into Vezo seems to underestimate the difficulty of learning to be Vezo for a former Masikoro; we would guess that learning from scratch how to dig a canoe, sail or fish is rather more challenging than Rolpha suggested. In fact, Rolpha completely ignored the learning process, or rather he ignored its duration over time.
In this, Rolpha's attitude was quite typical. Whereas all my Vezo friends seemed willing to recognize the time involved in learning and becoming Vezo (`... and at the end, when he knows, he becomes Vezo'), they tended to put forward a very different representation, one in which learning comes as an abrupt transition (a `jump' rather than a process) from a state of
not-yet-knowing to a state of full knowledge. Rolpha himself suggested what causes this `jump', when he stated that his ancestors were Masikoro because they lived in the interior, and explained that they began to learn and master Vezo practices as soon as they settled in a Vezo village. In other words, the learning process appears to be triggered by the transition from one place of residence to another; and since a movement through space tends to be fast and abrupt, the learning process is similarly portrayed as an abrupt and easy `jump'.
When Rolpha suggested that where one lives determines what one learns --in the interior, his forefathers had learnt to be Masikoro, on the coast they learnt to be Vezo --he was making more than the common sense observation that people who live off the land learn about rice, maize and manioc, while people who live off the sea learn about fish and canoes. place; here, I wish to discuss a point that remained implicit in Rolpha's account. Rolpha told us how his forefathers learnt to paddle the canoe; what he did not say, however, is that, having learnt to do so, his forefathers became Vezo when they paddled the canoe; that is, that to be Vezo is to act Vezo. We saw earlier that children are Vezo when they swim in the ocean; that a Masikoro is Vezo when he goes fishing; that I was Vezo when I fought the sea.
Throughout my stay with the Vezo, I witnessed a constant stream of commentary on the making and undoing of Vezo-ness: when a child carries the paddle of his father's canoe on his shoulder, he is told that he is `very Vezo' (fa Vezo mare iha); when a man makes a mistake while sailing in rough wind, his companions chide him that he must have become a Masikoro (fa mihamasikoro iha?); when a woman, whose forefathers were Antandroy, mistakenly eats a crab's heart, which the Vezo avoid because it causes allergic reactions, she is asked, after recovering from a severe asthma attack, whether she has become Antandroy (ka mihaAntandroy iha?); but when the same woman saves a canoe from capsizing by plunging into the water to grab hold of the outrigger and then skilfully changes the position of the masts, she is recognized as being `a very Vezo woman' (fa Vezo mare ampela io).
These and many other examples I could provide may seem rather odd. We may wonder whether the Vezo are unsure about who they are; or whether the incessant commentary about being Vezo when they sail skilfully, and Masikoro when they make a blunder, shows that being Vezo or Masikoro is actually a rather trivial matter. In fact, neither suggestion is correct: the Vezo are neither torn by an insoluble identity crisis, nor do they consider their identity as being an unremarkable incident of their lives. The point is rather that for the Vezo --people who are not a kind of people --`being' Vezo is an activity rather than a state of being.
Malagasy is a language that lacks the verb `to be'. In Vezo, to say that a woman is beautiful, one says `soa (beautiful) ampela io (that woman)'; however, to say that she `is' Vezo, one says `fa Vezo ampela io'. Here the particle fa conveys the notion of an accomplished act, as in fa vita, it's finished; fa matanjaky iha, you have gained weight; fa maty, it's dead, broken, done in. While being beautiful is a quality and a state of being, `being' Vezo is the result of an activity. If we think of `being' Vezo as an activity, a way of doing, it becomes easier to understand how a person can `be' Vezo at one moment and If it is true that certain people are associated with certain places --the Vezo with the coast, the Masikoro with the interior, for example --the Vezo also recognize that certain `ways of doing things' (fomba) 13 are associated with certain places. This applies at the most general level to `the customs of the people of the coast' (fomban'olo an-driaky) as opposed to those of `the people of the interior' (fomban'olo an-tety); but it also applies to more localized customs associated with specific localities along the coast. In both cases, while the association between place and `ways of doing' is enduring, the association between people and `ways of doing' peculiar to a place is entirely contingent: `ways of doing things' stick to people and are dropped as individuals move from place to place.
The best example of the contingency of customs concerns the different ways the Vezo position the masts of their canoe. In Betania, one of the two villages where I did fieldwork, both masts are placed in the mast-step at the bottom of the canoe's hull. In the second village, Belo, only the shorter mast is placed in the mast-step; the other mast is tied to the first one with a kind of slip-knot (dinikily). People in both places were willing to explain the advantages and inconveniences of each system, but everyone rejected my suggestion that the use of different techniques was the result of different sailing conditions in the two areas.
They insisted instead that it was just a matter of people in Betania and in Belo being used to different systems. Here `to be used' (fa zatsy) to something means, in effect, to have become used to it; my informants claimed, somewhat tautologically, that people become used to sailing in a certain way because they live in a place where that way of sailing is what people are used to. When someone moves elsewhere, they adopt whichever way of sailing the people in the new place are used to.
In the light of this and other similar examples, the terms `stick' and `drop' that I use to describe the relation between people and the `ways of doing things' associated with where The terms used by Watson to describe how the Kainantu come to acquire their identity --to instill, to infuse, to imbibe, to ingest --are quite foreign to the Vezo. The reason is that Vezo people never `come to have the land in themselves': they adopt the `ways of doing' of the place where they live, but when they move, they do not take their old ways with them.
The contrast here is between people like the Kainantu who are `un-kinded' at birth, but who gradually acquire, or absorb, characteristics of permanent `kinded-ness' akin to descent, 14 and people like the Vezo whose identity does not become a permanent feature of the person, but remains contingent on what the person does in a certain place and at a certain point in time. 15 Vezo-ness, in other words, is not `instilled' or `infused' in the person; Vezoness is better thought of as a shape that people take --but it is a shape that never hardens.
This is more than a play of words. Vezo-ness shapes people's bodies, leaving deep albeit impermanent traces on them. My informants called these traces the `signs that one is Vezo'
(famantaram-bezo).
The hands of men are scarred by Vezo-ness. When a particularly large, heavy and strong fish bites on the hook, the nylon line cuts the men's fingers. This rarely causes an injury, for their hands are very thick-skinned, but the fishing line will leave a white scar, and a sort of streaked callus will gradually develop. Fishing lines leave other, more noticeable scars on the men's waists. When a fishing team decides to move elsewhere to find a better location, both men paddle the canoe and let their fishing lines trawl in the water behind. In order not to miss a bite while they paddle, the men tie the lines loosely around their waists. If a fish does bite, the line will tighten around the men's waist and burn a red line in the skin. As the skin heals, the sharp red lines slowly turn into whitish scars.
These scars were often displayed for my benefit. When Vezo men told me that `the Vezo are not a kind of people' and explained that one is rendered Vezo by one's activities at sea, they would bring their hands forward and, slightly twisting round, point to the scars on their waist. The scars on their body were the `signs that one is of Vezo'.
If I asked women whether there were `signs of Vezoness' on their hands, they would suggest that I look at the hands of Masikoro women, which have a callus at the base of the thumb from the pounding of maize and rice. For the Vezo women, it was the lack of a callus on their hands that shows that they are Vezo.
Another way of recognizing Vezo men and women is by the way they walk and move their body. Because they live on the coast, they are used to walking on the sand. To do so effectively, however, requires a special technique: to avoid getting stuck in the sand one must grasp it with one's toes, while at the same time making a slightly rotating movement with one's heels. When people who are not accustomed to walking on the sand come to the coast, Yet, although the scars people display mark them profoundly, they are also impermanent.
Thus, my informants remarked that when they resume fishing after the long period of inactivity during the wet season, their fingers are soft and more easily hurt. Once, during a rice shortage, the women in my village were forced to buy maize which they had to pound every day. They showed me their hands, remarking that they were becoming Masikoro: at the base of the thumb, a blister was starting to develop into a callus. If a Vezo spends some time in the interior, the blisters on her toes will gradually harden into a sign of Masikoro-ness. In other words, like Vezo-ness itself, the signs that Vezo identity leaves on the body are performative --a body becomes recognizable as a Vezo body only through its activities in the present. The term mitindroke is analytically significant because it describes the livelihood of the Vezo without referring to their productive technology and activity, fishing; mitindroke, in other words, describes generic (rather than technologically-defined) features of foraging.
Moreover, it is on the basis of these generic features that the Vezo draw the contrast between their mode of livelihood and that of the Masikoro. Thus, while a person who `looks for food' goes out today (androany), sees things (mahita raha) and collects a little something (mahazo raha kely kely) every day (isanandro isanandro), an agriculturalist must wait (miamby) for her products to grow (raha mitiry); at the end of the productive cycle she will reap a large crop (mahazo vokatsy bevata). People who `look for food' do not have land (tsy mana tanimbary, tsy mana baiboho); cultivators, by contrast, possess land which comes to them from the past (avy bakañy bakañy).
From this contrast, we can desume that the livelihood of the Vezo is characterized by the unmediated acquisition of objects that exist independently of the person who seeks and acquires them. 18 This acquisition occurs on a clearly specified time-scale: `looking for food' is a day-by-day affair and does not involve the transmission of property over time. Finally, Vezo livelihood is a small-scale, individually-based activity. So now we understand why the canoe is the livelihood of the Vezo. Vezo canoes last at most two years; they are light, flexible and fragile; they are built by only a few people at a time and sail no more than two; even the most successful catch can be no larger than what the canoe's narrow hull can carry back to shore. The canoe's physical structure reflects and incorporates all the characteristics of the livelihood of the Vezo: it is flimsy, short-lived and small-scale.
The Masikoro, of course, do not have canoes (tsy manan-daka); a favourite joke of the Vezo is that if a Masikoro were to dig a canoe, he would end up with a cow's canoe (lakan'aomby) --in other words, with a cattle trough. What is more, if a Masikoro were to try to sail out in the ocean, his canoe would capsize and he would drown. The Vezo, on the other hand, do not have fields (tsy mana tanim-bary, tsy mana baiboho); if they did, they would be wasting their time (tsy misy dicany). As my informants explained, the reason for this is that when a rice or maize crop is almost ripe and the fields need constant supervision to scare off the birds, who can destroy an entire harvest in a few hours, the Vezo will guard the fields for a few days; but as soon as they hear that the fish are biting well at sea, they will take off to fish for the day. On that one day, their harvest will be totally destroyed and all their efforts will have been in vain.
This story portrays the difference between the livelihood of the Masikoro and the Vezo in terms of occupational incompatibility; 19 but the two are incompatible from another perspective also. We have seen that one feature that distinguishes agriculture from foraging is their different temporal scale; the former requires waiting and planning, whereas the second is present-oriented, based on the daily acquisition of small things to be consumed immediately. The Vezo emphasize this difference in strategy by portraying themselves as lacking wisdom (tsy mahihitsy): they `make a lot of money but they don't know how to `manage' it [lit. make it work]' (zahay Vezo mahazo vola maro ka tsy mahay mampiasa vola zahay). While they `find money in the sea' (mahita vola añaty rano), they are unable to save it: what they earn, they spend.
There is, indeed, a remarkable degree of camplacency about the Vezo's lack of financial wisdom. Sometimes they compare their eating habits to those of invisible forest creatures called kalanoro. To `eat like a kalanoro' (atao sakafon' kalanoro) means to eat up all the good food one has prepared for lunch, with no thought for the evening meal; then `in the evening there is no food and one just sits around' (lafa hariva, laoke tsy misy, de mipetsaky avao teña). Among the Masikoro, the Vezo are reputed to eat high-quality food; conversely, the Masikoro are known to have plenty of staple food (rice, maize or manioc), but to be `poor in side-dishes' (mijaly laoke), and to eat only leaves (ravy) or grass (akata), i.e. cultivated or wild vegetables. The contrast between the Masikoro's plentiful staple food and the Vezo's tasty side-dishes highlights the difference between the wisdom of the Masikoro, who must wait for their harvests and plan expenditure over the long term through saving and short-term culinary deprivation, and the Vezo's lack of wisdom which allows them to enjoy luxury short-term consumption. Expressed in these terms, the two economic strategies appear clearly incompatible.
The one cannot be combined with the other; the same person cannot be simultaneously engaged in cultivation and in fishing, and cannot adopt planning and saving while at the same time enjoying short-term consumption; similarly, people cannot simultaneously be living in the interior and on the coast. 20 The Vezo seem to regard the difference between themselves and the Masikoro in terms of absolute and mutual incompatibility. 21 However, this incompatibility between the two modes of livelihood implies nothing about the people who practise such different activities, with such different strategies and in such different places.
That is to say that the absolute difference between Vezo and Masikoro lies in the things they do, and not in the people themselves. 22 My informants stressed that Vezo and Masikoro activities --including how women braid their hair or men wear their blanket --are done by different people; this, however, does not mean that such people differ before they act as Vezo or Masikoro.
In his discussion of totemism as an alternative mode of classification to ethnicity, Comaroff remarks that within the totemic mode people are divided into `units within a common humanity'; while collective identites are defined `in contrast to one another', the various units portray themselves as `similar yet different' (1987:304) . 23 Although I have no evidence to suggest that the Vezo conceive of an abstract humanity, existing prior to the specific place it occupies and to the specific activity that keeps it alive, the Vezo appear indeed to regard the Masikoro as `similar yet different'. We have seen why the Masikoro are absolutely different; the reason why they are also similar, or identical to the Vezo, is that the identity of the Masikoro is produced by a process analogous to that which produces the identity of the Vezo. If difference is constituted through analogy, we may argue, with Wagner (1977) , that what is differentiated must be assumed to be the same. In the context of his analysis of Daribi kinship, Wagner argues that if we assume, for analytical purposes, that kin relationships and the kin identified through these relationships are basically alike, and that the difference between them must therefore be actively created, the only way to create difference is by
analogy, since what is differentiated is originally assumed to be the same. 24 With the Vezo, I
would argue that the reason why difference cannot be analytically assumed, is that it is not established through `kinded-ness': if people are not born to be what they are, we cannot assume either that they are born to be different from others. Instead, difference, like identity, is created out of `un-kindedness' as a difference in practice. In this section, I explore a more active denial of the determining power of the past. I consider the typical Vezo narrative about their relationship with the Sakalava kings who, up to the colonial period, ruled over the whole of the western region of Madagascar. As we shall see, this narrative is both a refusal of the `ties of bonds' imposed by kings and, more generally, a refusal of an identity rooted in `history'.
When I asked whether the Vezo had formerly been subjects of the Sakalava kings (nanompo mpanjaka ny Vezo?), the stock answer I received was that after the white man arrived in As my informants recounted it, the mpanjaka came for two reasons. First of all, they came to collect tribute, in the form of typical Vezo goods like sea turtle and certain especially prized fish; 26 but they also came to `survey people's ancestors' (mitety raza), that is, to ask people who their ancestors were and where they came from.
Giving tribute to a mpanjaka was a way of showing allegiance and of proving to be a subject (manompo azy); hence, when the Vezo took to sea instead of meeting the mpanjaka's demands, they were effectively refusing to recognize subjection. But why did the mpanjaka want to `survey people's ancestors'? And why were the Vezo anxious to avoid being questioned? Whereas the first question went unanswered, the reply I was given to the second one was that `the Vezo do not like ties and bonds' (tsy tiam-Bezo fifeheza).
In order to pursue these issues further and to clarify what is implicit in these statements, I shall briefly turn to the literature on the Sakalava kingdoms, in particular to the analysis of relations between the monarchy and its subjects. Although there are significant differences in approach between scholars like Lombard (1988) , Feeley-Harnik (1978, 1982, 1991) , Baré (1977) , Schlemmer (1983) and Fauroux (1980) , a theme that is shared by all these studies is that which might be glossed as the `politics of identity'. Very schematically, this consisted in the creation through conquest of a new social and ritual order in which formerly independent and now subject people were defined through criteria that referred to, and were centred around, the monarchy. The area in which this re-definition of identity occurred was history (tantara). Thus, while `the only tantara of significance to Sakalava as a whole is the history of the Sakalava monarchy, from its origin to its present-day location' (1978:411) , the only tantara of significance to individual Sakalava is that which recounts how they and their ancestors came to be associated with the monarchy as nobles or workers (1978:404, 411) . It is only through this association that people are placed within `history' (that is, within royal history) and are defined as subjects and members of the kingdom.
We can now return to the Vezo who fled with their canoes when the mpanjaka came to the coast to `survey their ancestors'. In view of the unequal distribution of `history' between royals and subjects and among different subjects, we are now better able to appreciate the deep political significance of the mpanjaka's questioning. To ask people who their ancestors were and where they came from was to ask them about their tantara; the mpanjaka's survey of the `history' people claimed for themselves through their genealogies was a means of redefining those `histories' as a fragment of his own, royal, history. Because `history' was carried in one's genealogy, `surveying people's ancestors' was a means to transform previously autonomous people into subjects of the monarchy by subsuming them into the general history of the kingdom. By taking to the sea with their canoes, by refusing to pay tribute and to disclose to the mpanjaka who their ancestors were and where they came from, the Vezo were avoiding to be so subsumed. Because under the Sakalava the only `history' available became royal history (which attached people to a sequence of royal events unfolding from the past to the present), the Vezo's refusal of `Sakalava history' was also a refusal of `history' as such. past, a present and a future, but it does not need to participate in the actual passage of time to realize its existence. Rather, time is obliterated by the pretence that the essence of the ethnic group remains unaffected by the passing of the generations; this is because each generation has received that essence from the previous one, and is thus merely one of a long chain of substitutions. The present is thus seen as (or is hoped to turn out to be) simply a replica of a permanent and unchanging past. For people who are what they were born to be the present may constitute a menace to the continuity of their identity and its presumed perpetuity;
otherwise, if it is not entirely superfluous, the present is just a pretext to enact what one was, is and will be outside time.
With the Vezo, we are faced with a completely different scenario. The Vezo have no past, or rather they do not identify one as the source and explanation of what they are in the present. When they say that they are not a kind of people, while displaying the deep but impermanent traces that their activities leave on their body, they remind us that having a past, a heritage, a tradition makes no difference to the realization of their identity. Vezo-ness is not an essence that always remains the same and which embodies both the past and the future;
Vezo-ness exists only in the present, where a person has to move, to learn, to be shaped and scarred, in order to `be' Vezo. Since the Vezo must act in order to `be', they shed all pasts;
free of the `ties and bonds' imposed by history, they remain securely inside the present. 2. The similarities between this quest and that for a cultural analysis of kinship are obvious. In fact, Linnekin and Poyer discuss the similarity between Western theory of ethnicity and `American kinship' as analysed by Schneider (1968); it appears moreover that Schneider's argument that `nationality' and `kinship' are similarly structured (1977) , explains why, as argued by Keys (1981:6) , ethnicity can be thought of as `a form of kinship reckoning'.
3. Cfr. Covell 1987 and especially Alvarez ms., on the `invention' of Malagasy ethnic groups to meet the needs of French colonial policy, the so-called `politique des races', a precondition of which was the existence of descrete indegenous groups, whose leaders the French administration could use to gain control over the local population.
4. For bibliographical refernces and a more detailed analysis of the literature, see Astuti 1991.
5. A significant difference with the Mashpee case, however, is that the virtual deletion of the Vezo from the ethnic map of Madagascar (the editor of the country's ethnografic atlas rather grudgingly records a small Vezo settlement around the town of Tulear, because the Vezo have been registered as an `ethnic' group in the statistics) has so far had no adverse economic or political effects; similarly, at the individual level, deciding whether a person is Vezo or not has none of the implications (in terms of access to land) discussed by Linnekin for Hawaiians (1990: 153-54).
6. This point was suggested by one of the anonymous reviewers. 11. Linnekin and Poyer (1990:8-9 ) draw a suggestive parallell between Lamarckian cultural identities and Sahlins' `performative structures' (1987) : cultural identities `are made as well as born'; they are constructed out of practice.
12. In the continuum from `more cultural and less ethnic' to `less cultural and more ethnic' identities along which the ethnographic examples presented in Linnekin and Poyer (1990) are ordered, the Kainantu feature as the most extreme case of Lamarckianism.
13. The term fomba refers to ways of doing anything, including a certain way of fishing, cooking, eating, talking, offering food to the ancestors, marrying, giving birth, etc.
14. See Watson 1990:39-40 for his discussion of the ethnic dimension of Kainantu identity. For a more general discussion of descent within Lamarckian models of identity, see Lieber 1990.
15. I could have drawn a similar contrast with Pomponio's ethnography on the Mandok islanders, `a Lamarckian case with a Mendelian twist ' (1990:43) . Once again, the contrast lies in the way the link between people and land is construed. Although Mandok are made what they are by the place where they live (the sea as opposed to the bush), their perceptions of their `essential identity' is informed by the idea that `despite the fact that they originally migrated from primarily bush locations, through subsequent generations the Mandok seem to have absorbed the autochthonous essence of a maritime habitat' (1990:52; added emphasis), elsewhere referred to by Pomponio as `marigenic substance'. 17. Vezo and Masikoro speak the same language; the Vezo, however, are recognized to speak more softly and slower than the Masikoro.
18. I have discussed elsewhere (Astuti 1995, ch.3) the Vezo's representation of the sea as an ever abundant container of fish.
19. My informants did not use this term; I employ it as short-hand for the kind of oppositions they drew between Vezo and Masikoro activities.
20. Individuals or groups who contradict this postulate by engaging in both kinds of economic pursuit are considered to `be' Vezo or Masikoro contextually.
21. One may note in passing that the incompatibility between Vezo and Masikoro also establishes their mutual dependency: the Vezo need the Masikoro to provide them with agricultural products, the Masikoro need the Vezo to provide them with fish.
22. I wish to thank Marilyn Strathern for suggesting this point to me.
23. `Totemism' as defined by Comaroff is clearly different from `cultural totemism' as defined by Schwartz (1982) ; in the latter case, `cultural totemism' is a domain in which `ethnic groupings [are] conceived of by men as if these groupings were species ' (1982:127) .
